



Inter-SEPP connection testing Guidelines

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1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

This document provides testing guidelines for connecting various types of SEPPs and proxies, operated by operators or service providers in the operator domain or in the IPX service domain.

These tests validate parts of the N32 interface as defined in 3GPP TS 29.573 [3], as well as the N32s and N32p interfaces as defined in GSMA NG.113 [1])

Editor's note: The current version of this document does not cover PRINS/ALS and HTTP proxies.

Annex A contains a detailed description of the different tests.

1.2 Scope


This document provides guidelines to test 5G SA signalling between various types of SEPPs used in roaming.

The following interfaces should be tested:

1. N32 for bilateral (using TLS security mechanism) – called N32(TLS)



2. N32 for hubbing (using PRINS security mechanism) – called N32(PRINS)



3. N32s (using TLS security mechanism)



4. N32p (using TLS security mechanism)



Figure 1: Roaming framework as defined in NG.113 [1]

The scope of this test book is to test the N32 (N32-c/N32-f) interface as well as the N32p and N32s interfaces between two SEPP for the following contexts:

- Testing N32 connection setup before 5G SA roaming opening (N32) as defined in NG.143
- Testing N32 connection when upgrading SEPP software or changing SEPP supplier

Note: SEPP hereby refers to various types of SEPPs defined by GSMA in addition to the PMN SEPP defined in 3GPP 5G specifications. MNO 5G SA signalling simulator will be used to emulate MNO.




Figure 2: Scope of testing in this document

1.3 Definition of Terms

Term	Description
i-SEPP	Initiating SEPP identified uniquely by i-SEPP FQDN
i-	Prefix used to indicate that the parameter is related to i-SEPP domain
r-SEPP	Responding SEPP identified uniquely by r-SEPP FQDN
r-	Prefix used to indicate that the parameter is related to r-SEPP domain

1.4 Document Cross-References

Ref	Document Number	Title
1	GSMA PRD NG.113	5GS Roaming guidelines
2	GSMA PRD FS.34	Key Management for 4G and 5G inter-PMN Security
3	3GPP TS 29.573	5G System; Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN); Interconnection; Stage 3
4	3GPP TS 23.501	System architecture for the 5G System (5GS); Stage 2
5	3GPP TS 23.502	Procedures for the 5G System (5GS); Stage 2
6	3GPP TS 33.501	Security architecture and procedures for 5G system
7	3GPP TS 29.500	Technical Realization of Service Based Architecture; Stage 3
8	GSMA PRD IR.67	DNS Guidelines for Service Providers and GRX and IPX Providers
9	GSMA PRD NG.143	5G SA Roaming Testing
10	IETF RFC 5256	The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol v1.2

11	IETF RFC 8446	The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol v1.3
12	3GPP TS 33.517	5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) network product class

2 SEPP Provider configuration

2.1 SEPP interface configuration

This section contains the interface configuration of different SEPPs, defined in the section 1.2.

The SEPP interface configuration is provided for different interfaces (N32, N32s, N32p) ; only SEPP FQDN are changed depending on the interface.

The tests described in Annex A use the N32 protocol message format. Since N32-c/-f identical to the format used on N32s and N32p, a single N32 test description can be valid for the interfaces N32s and N32p in addition to N32. However, some tests do not apply to all interfaces; for these tests, this is indicated.

N32 interface configuration (N32(TLS) or N32(PRINS))

Parameter	PROVIDER1	PROVIDER2
Well-known FQDN	sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.3gppnetwork.org	sepp.5gc.mnc2.mcc2.3gppnetwork.org
SEPP FQDN	PMN SEPP: Sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.3gppnetwork.org or Hosted/Group SEPP: Sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.<PROVIDER1>.ipxpnetwork.org	PMN SEPP: Sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc2.mcc2.3gppnetwork.org or Hosted/Group SEPP: Sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc2.mcc2.<PROVIDER2>.ipxpnetwork.org
SEPP IP address	IP1	IP2
PLMNId used for MNO	MCC1 - MNC1 MCC1a – MNC1a (for multiple plmnId)	MCC2 - MNC2 MCC2a – MNC2a (for multiple plmnId)

N32s interface configuration

Parameter	PROVIDER1	PROVIDER2
Well-known FQDN	sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.3gppnetwork.org	sepp.5gc.mnc2.mcc2.3gppnetwork.org
SEPP FQDN (option1)	PMN SEPP: Sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.3gppnetwork.org	SP SEPP: Sepp2.sepp.5gc.mnc2.mcc2.<PROVIDER1>.ipxpnetwork.org
SEPP FQDN (option 2)	SP SEPP: Sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.<PROVIDER1>.ipxpnetwork.org	PMN SEPP: Sepp2.sepp.5gc.mnc2.mcc2.3gppnetwork.org
SEPP IP address	IP1	IP2
PLMNId used for MNO	MCC1 - MNC1 MCC1a – MNC1a (for multiple plmnId)	MCC2 - MNC2 MCC2a – MNC2a (for multiple plmnId)

N32p interface configuration

Parameter	PROVIDER1	PROVIDER2
Well-known FQDN	sepp.5gc.<Hub-ID1>.ipxnetwork.org	sepp.5gc.<Hub-ID2>.ipxnetwork.org
SEPP FQDN	Sepp1.sepp.5gc.<Hub-ID1>.ipxnetwork.org	Sepp1.sepp.5gc.<Hub-ID2>.ipxnetwork.org
SEPP IP address	IP1	IP2
PLMNid used for MNO	MCC1-MNC1 MCC1a – MNC1a (for multiple plmnId)	MCC2-MNC2 MCC2a – MNC2a (for multiple plmnId)

2.2 SEPP 3GPP release and features

This test book assumes that R16 is the basic 3GPP release to be supported by the PMN SEPP and covers tests for releases from R16 onwards.

This test book is valid for different configurations, supporting the PMN SEPP in different 3GPP releases and features and supporting GSMA additionally defined SEPP types in NG.113 [1].

Editor's Note: RI HTTP proxy tests to be added in next version.

Typical examples of N32 protocol (N32 procedures and API) are listed hereafter

- N32-c termination
- Usage of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id (R17)
- Error cause on N32-c or N32-f ()

Some test cases are not applicable if the SEPP does not support the functionality, feature or header. For example, Tests 4.6.1 is not applicable if the SEPP does not support the custom header 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id.

Apart from these optional features, some technical assumptions are applied in this document:

- Usage of TLS or PRINS as security mechanism
- Usage of custom HTTP header 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot (R16) (not telescopic FQDN)
- Usage of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id (if available)

2.3 Certificates

2.3.1 Root Certificate

This section shows examples of certain fields in the root certificates exchanged by IPX providers to enable TLS authentication.

More details can be found in annex B.1.

Root certificate (PMN-SEPP)	Issuer: CN = CA. mnc1.mcc1.3gppnetwork.org Subject: CN=CA. <PLMN-Id>.3gppnetwork.org
Root certificate (Hosted -SEPP)	Issuer: CN = CA. .<HS-Id>.ipxnetwork.org Subject: CN=CA.<HS-Id>.ipxnetwork.org
Root certificate (Hub -SEPP)	Issuer: CN = CA. .<Hub-Id>.ipxnetwork.org, Subject: CN=CA.<Hub-Id>.ipxnetwork.org

2.3.2 Leaf Certificate

This section contains certain fields of the leaf certificates exchanged between two SEPP types to enable TLS authentication.

More details can be found in annex B.2.

Leaf certificate (PMN-SEPP)	Issuer: CN=CA.mnc1.mcc1.3gppnetwork.org Subject: CN=sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.3gppnetwork.org Subject Alternative Name: sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.3gppnetwork.org, sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1a.mcc1a.3gppnetwork.org,
--------------------------------	---

Note: This leaf certificate is used on N32 and N32s interfaces

Leaf certificate (Hosted-SEPP)	Issuer: CN=CA.HS1.ipxnetwork.org Subject: CN=sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.HS1.ipxnetwork.org Subject Alternative Name: sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.HS1.ipxnetwork.org, sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1a.mcc1a.HS1.ipxnetwork.org,
-----------------------------------	---

Note: This leaf certificate is used on N32 and N32s interfaces

Leaf certificate (Hub SEPP)	Issuer: CN=CA.Hub1.ipxnetwork.org Subject: CN=sepp1.sepp.5gc.Hub1.ipxnetwork.org Subject Alternative Name: sepp1.sepp.5gc.Hub1.ipxnetwork.org,
--------------------------------	---

Note: This leaf certificate is used on N32p and N32s interfaces

3 Process

1. Exchange testing document with SEPP configuration
2. Exchange root TLS certificates
3. Configure SEPP type with remote SEPP type and associated certificates, including trust anchors/trust stores.
4. Configure the 5G SA signalling simulators.

4 Test lists

The test descriptions use the N32 protocol message format. Since N32-c/f is identical to the format used on N32s and N32p, a single N32 test description can be valid for the interfaces N32s and N32p in addition to N32. However, some tests do not apply to all interfaces; for these tests, this is indicated.

4.1 SEPP discovery via DNS

This section describes the discovery procedure for the i-SEPP discovering the r-SEPP, with the following technical assumptions:

- Usage of Well-known FQDN + DNS
- Usage of SEPP FQDN + DNS




Figure 3: SEPP discovery via DNS (See NG.113 [1])

Test list

- SEPP discovery via DNS (See A.1)

Test variants

- N32 (TLS or PRINS) / N32s / N32p
- i-SEPP / r-SEPP actors

4.2 Basic N32 connection

This section describes the basic N32 connection, with the following technical assumptions:

- PLMN is composed of a unique PLMNId

The purpose of this test is to verify that the capability negotiation procedure works as intended.




Figure 4 [3] Figure 5.2.2-1: Security Capability Negotiation Procedure

Test list

- Create N32 connection (See A.2.1 for TLS, see A.2a.1 for PRINS)
- Exchange N32 messages (See A.2.2)
- Stop N32 connection (See A.2.3)

Test variants

- N32 (TLS or PRINS) / N32s / N32p
- I-SEPP / r-SEPP actors

4.3 Multi PLMNid N32 connection

This section describes the same tests as previous section, but the PLMN is composed of several PLMNid.

Configuration example with two PLMN IDs:

Parameter	IPX1	IPX2
SEPP FQDN	Sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.3gppnetwork.org	Sepp2.sepp.5gc.mnc2.mcc2.3gppnetwork.org
PLMNid used for MNO	MCC1 - MNC1 MCC1a – MNC1a (for multiple plmnId)	MCC2 - MNC2 MCC2a – MNC2a (for multiple plmnId)

Test list

- Create N32 connection (TLS or PRINS) (See A.3.1)
- Exchange N32 messages (See A.3.2) with all the different PLMNid
- Stop N32 connection (See A.3.3)

Test variants

- N32 (TLS or PRINS) / N32s (not applicable to N32p due to the fact that PLMNid are not defined for N32p negotiation)
- I-SEPP / r-SEPP actors

4.4 Certificate error

This section describes tests containing certificate errors.

Same configuration as 4.1 except of certificate configuration containing some errors.

Multiple cause could be simulated see Alert message enum in annex D:

4.4.1 Wrong r-SEPP root/leaf certificate at i-SEPP

This section describes tests containing certificate errors at the initiating SEPP.

Test list

- r-SEPP root certificate error at i-SEPP side (See A.4.1)
- r-SEPP leaf certificate error at i-SEPP side (See A.4.2)

Test variants

- N32 (TLS or PRINS) / N32s / N32p
- i-SEPP / r-SEPP actors

4.4.2 Wrong i-SEPP root/leaf certificate at r-SEPP

This section describes tests containing certificate errors at the receiving SEPP.

Test list

- i-SEPP root certificate error at r-SEPP side (See A.4.3)
- i-SEPP leaf certificate error at r-SEPP side (See A.4.4)

Test variants

- N32 (TLS or PRINS) / N32s / N32p
- i-SEPP / r-SEPP actors

4.5 N32-c error cases

Several parameters are tested: N32-c connection is rejected if one of the following N32-c parameters is wrongly configured:

- PLMNIdList
- supportedSecCapability
- 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported
- Sender

4.5.1 N32-c error with wrong PLMNid

N32-c connection is rejected if PLMNid is not matching the agreed one.

Test list

- N32-c error with wrong PLMNid (See A.5.1) and check that N32-c is rejected when PLMNid is not matching the agreed one

Test variants

- N32 (TLS or PRINS) / N32s
- i-SEPP / r-SEPP actors

4.5.2 N32-c error with wrong supportedSecCapability

N32-c connection is rejected if supportedSecCapability is not matching the agreed one.

Test list

- N32-c error with wrong supportedSecCapability (See A.5.2) and check that N32-c is rejected when supportedSecCapability is not matching the agreed one

Test variants

- N32 (TLS or PRINS) / N32s / N32p
- i-SEPP / r-SEPP actors

4.5.3 N32-c error with wrong 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported

N32-c connection is rejected if 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported is not matching the agreed one.

Test list

- N32-c error with wrong 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported (See A.5.3) and check that N32-c is rejected when 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported is not matching the agreed one

Test variants

- N32 (TLS or PRINS) / N32s / N32p
- i-SEPP / r-SEPP actors

4.5.4 N32-c error with wrong Sender

N32-c connection is rejected if Sender is not matching the agreed one.

Test list

- N32-c error with wrong sender (See A.5.4) and check that N32-c is rejected when sender is not matching the agreed one

Test variants

- N32 (TLS or PRINS) / N32s / N32p
- i-SEPP / r-SEPP actors

4.5.5 N32-c error for rejection of HTTP CONNECT message

PMN SEPP HTTP CONNECT request to the RI is for setting up TCP in preparation for establishing end-to-end between PMN SEPPs the TLS connection.

The RI rejects the setup of TCP and hence a N32-c TLS connection cannot be established between the PMN SEPPs.

Test list

- N32-c error when Hub SEPP or RI HTTP Proxy is rejecting to pass N32-c TLS traffic

Test variants

- Two party test between PMN SEPP and RI or between two RIs.

Note: In this version of the document no related test is provided in annex A.

4.6 N32-f policing

As defined in 3GPP TS 23.501 [4], section 5.9.3.2, the SEPP shall implement anti-spoofing mechanisms that enable cross-layer validation of source and destination address and identifiers (e.g. FQDNs or PLMN IDs). An example for such an anti-spoofing mechanism is the following: If there is a mismatch between different layers of the message or the destination address does not belong to the SEPP's own PLMN, the message is discarded.

Generally, two options could be used to block the message:

- silently discard (log the event or do not log the event)
- reject with error

4.6.1 N32-f policing with wrong 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id

3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id HTTP custom header is defined in 3GPP TS 29.500 (R17) [7]. This header shall be inserted by an NF service consumer or an NF service producer originating an HTTP request message towards a different PLMN.

The SEPP shall implement anti-spoofing mechanisms on 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id. If there is a mismatch, the message is blocked (discarded or rejected).

Test list

- N32-f policing with wrong 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id (R17) (See A.6.1)

Test variants

- N32 / N32s / N32p
- I-SEPP / r-SEPP actors

4.6.2 N32-f policing with wrong 3GPP-sbi-target-apiroot

This 3GPP-sbi-target-apiroot header is used between SEPPs to indicate the apiRoot of the target URI towards HTTP server in another PLMN, when TLS security with the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header is used between the SEPPs.

The SEPP shall implement anti-spoofing mechanisms on 3gpp-Sbi-target-apiroot. If there is a mismatch, the message is blocked (discarded or rejected).

Test list

- N32-f policing with wrong 3GPP-sbi-target-apiroot (See A.6.2)

Test variants

- N32 / N32s / N32p
- I-SEPP / r-SEPP actors

4.6.3 N32-f policing with wrong authority

The SEPP shall implement anti-spoofing mechanisms on authority. If there is a mismatch, the message is blocked (discarded or rejected).

Test list

To verify that N32-c establishment is rejected by i-SEPP/r-SEPP for these reasons:

- N32-f policing with wrong authority (See A.6.3)

Test variants

- N32 / N32s / N32p
- I-SEPP / r-SEPP actors

4.7 N32-f parameters

Some N32-f parameters require specific management.

4.7.1 N32-f addition of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id

3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id HTTP custom header is defined in 3GPP TS 29.500 (R17) [7]. This header shall be inserted by an NF service consumer or an NF service producer originating an HTTP request message towards a different PLMN.

If the sending SEPP or the receiving SEPP cannot uniquely determine the PLMN-ID, it is a configuration/deployment aspect to determine which PLMN-ID value should be included in the header by these entities or if the message should be dropped.

It shall indicate the PLMN-ID of the source PLMN of the HTTP request message (i.e., the PLMN ID of the NF Service Consumer or NF Service Producer).

Test list

- Check that i-SEPP will generate 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id on each N32-f message where 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id is not present (See A.7.1)

Test variants

- N32 / N32s / N32p
- I-SEPP / r-SEPP actors

4.8 SEPP restart

In case of restart with loss of data, the i-SEPP will set-up automatically all connections to the remote peers/partners (r-SEPP) according to the roaming configuration of the i-SEPP.

Annex A Test descriptions

The tests described in this annex use the N32 protocol message format. Since N32-c/f is identical to the format used on N32s and N32p, a single N32 test description can be valid for the interfaces N32s and N32p in addition to N32. However, some tests do not apply to all interfaces; for these tests, this is indicated.

A.1 SEPP discovery via DNS

Description

The i-SEPP shall initiate a r-SEPP discovery based on:

- Well-known FQDN + DNS
- SEPP FQDN + DNS

Applicability

3GPP Release 16 or later

N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

GSMA PRD IR.67 [8] - DNS Guidelines for Service Providers and GRX and IPX Providers section 4.19

GSMA NG.113 [1], including Detailed Design of TLS hop-by-hop

Reason for test

To verify that i-SEPP can discover the r-SEPP dynamically (Well-known FQDN + DNS, SEPP FQDN + DNS)

Initial configuration

It is assumed that a DNS client within the SEPP takes care of the DNS queries either directly or through a local DNS cache. The DNS client does not make any decisions on next steps but returns the result of each query up to the SEPP application layer. The SEPP application layer decides on the next DNS query to be sent. (Also see section 4.19 of IR.67).

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if the i-SEPP has discovered the correct r-SEPP IP address.

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP DNS	Message	r-	Comments
PROCEDURE DNS Well-known fqdn (OPTIONAL)					
1	-->		DNS NAPTR Req: <i>fqdn</i> = < <i>r-well-known FQDN</i> >		
2	<--		DNS NAPTR Resp: <i>SRV</i> = <i>_n32._tcp.</i> < <i>r-sepp domain</i> >		
Procedure DNS with SEPP fqdn (OPTIONAL)					
1	-->		DNS SRV Req: <i>SRV</i> = <i>_n32._tcp.</i> < <i>r-sepp domain</i> >		
2	<--		List of SEPP servers with priority/weight < <i>r-SEPP FQDN</i> >		Or one SEPP
3	-->		DNS A/AAAA Req: <i>URI</i> = <i>_n32._tcp.</i> < <i>r-SEPP FQDN</i> >		
4	<--		DNS A/AAAA Resp: @ <i>IP of r-SEPP</i>		

A.2 Basic N32 connection

A.2.1 Create N32 connection between SEPPs

Description

The initiating SEPP shall initiate a Security Capability Negotiation procedure towards the receiving SEPP. An N32-c end-to-end TLS connection shall be setup between the SEPPs before the initiation of this procedure. This procedure may also be used to tear down the N32-f TLS connection if the remote SEPP indicated support of the feature NFTLST (N32-f TLS connection termination) during the setup of the N32-c connection.

Applicability

3GPP Release 16 or later

N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Note: N32-f TLS part of the test is not part of the test if not set up immediately or PRINS is negotiated in N32-c. This is because “N32-f TLS” term is used in this test for addressing N32s-f and N32p-f or N32-f in case TLS is negotiated in N32-c.

Related core specifications

SEPP to support the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header as specified in 3GPP Release 16 TS 29.500

3GPP TS 29.573 [3], 5.2 (N32) and Annex C.2.2.5

GSMA NG.113 [1], including Detailed Design of TLS hop-by-hop

Reason for test

To verify that i-SEPP can successfully establish N32 between i-SEPP and r-SEPP based on TLS connection.

Initial configuration

i-SEPP is configured with r-SEPP root certificate.

r-SEPP is configured with i-SEPP root certificate.

The IP address of the r-SEPP is configured statically or discovered dynamically by DNS as described in SEPP discovery test (See A.1)




Figure 5: Test context – Create N32 connection

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if

- A TLS connection for N32-c has been established
- a N32-c between i-SEPP and r-SEPP is established and TLS for N32-f negotiated
- a TLS connection for N32-f has been established between i-SEPP and r-SEPP

Test procedure

-	Test procedure	Expected behaviour
1	Configure the r-SEPP using i-SEPP configuration Configure the i-SEPP using r-SEPP configuration	r-SEPP is active in i-SEPP i-SEPP is active in r-SEPP

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE TLS HANDSHAKE (for N32-c)				
1	-->	i-SEPP	Hello	
2	<--	r-SEPP	Hello Certificate (r-SEPP) CertificateRequest ServerKeyExchange r-SEPP_HelloDone	
3	-->	i-SEPP	Certificate (i-SEPP) i-SEPP_KeyExchange CertificateVerify ChangeCipherSpec Finished	
4	<--		ChangeCipherSpecFinished	
PROCEDURE N32-c HANDSHAKE (HTTP/2 capability exchange)				
1	-->		POST ../exchange-capability (SecNegotiateReqData) path: /n32c-handshake/v1/exchange-capability/ authority: r-SEPP - plmnIdList: i-PLMNid - sender: i-SEPP - supportedSecCapability: TLS or PRINS 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	Check PLMN-ID list at r-SEPP Note: No PLMNid are exchanged for N32p
2	<--		200 OK (SecNegotiateRspData) - plmnIdList: r-PLMNid - sender: r-SEPP - selectedSecCapability: TLS or PRINS 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	Check PLMN-ID list at i-SEPP
PROCEDURE TLS HANDSHAKE (for N32-f) – OPTIONAL (could be setup later)				
1	-->	i-SEPP	Hello	
2	<--	r-SEPP	Hello Certificate (r-SEPP) CertificateRequest ServerKeyExchange r-SEPP_HelloDone	
3	-->	i-SEPP	Certificate (i-SEPP) i-SEPP_KeyExchange CertificateVerify ChangeCipherSpec Finished	
4	<--		ChangeCipherSpecFinished	Check that TLS connection is successful for N32-f

A.2.2 Exchange NF signalling messages via N32-f

Description

The i-SEPP shall exchange 5G SA Signalling messages on N32-f connection with r-SEPP.

If TLS is the negotiated security policy between the SEPP on N32-c, then the N32-f shall involve only the forwarding of the HTTP/2 messages of the NF service producers and the NF service consumers without any reformatting at the SEPPs and/or the IPXs.

Applicability

3GPP Release 16 or later

N32, N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

SEPP to support the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header as specified in 3GPP Release 16 TS 29.500

3GPP TS 29.573 [3], 5.2 (N32) and Annex C.2.2.5

GSMA NG.113 [1], including Detailed Design of TLS hop-by-hop

Reason for test

To verify that i-SEPP can successfully forward N32-f messages between i-SEPP and r-SEPP.

Initial configuration

i-SEPP is configured with r-SEPP root certificate.

r-SEPP is configured with i-SEPP root certificate.

N32 connection is configured and working successfully (test A.2.1)




Figure 6: Test context – Exchange N32 messages

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if the i-SEPP has forwarded one N32-f message between i-SEPP and r-SEPP and received a message acknowledgement.

Test procedure

-	Test procedure	Expected behaviour
1	5G SA signalling simulator (sender) will generate a N32 message (example NRF discovery request) to the i-SEPP	i-SEPP will forward the message to r-SEPP r-SEPP will forward the message to 5G SA signalling simulator (recipient)
2	5G SA signalling simulator (recipient) will generate a N32 answer (example NRF discovery response) to the r-SEPP	r-SEPP will forward the message to i-SEPP i-SEPP will forward the message to 5G SA signalling simulator (sender)

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE N32-f				
1	-->		HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Request 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id = i-PLMNid 3GPP-sbi-target-apiroot= r-NRF authority = r-SEPP	Check that N32-f message is correctly received at r-SEPP
2	<--		HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Response status: 200 OK	Check that N32-f message acknowledgment is correctly received at i-SEPP

A.2.3 Stop N32 connection

Description

The i-SEPP shall delete an existing N32 connection with r-SEPP.

This procedure is used to tear down the N32-f TLS connection if the remote SEPP indicated support of the feature NFTLST (N32-f TLS connection termination) during the setup of the N32-c connection.

Applicability

3GPP Release 17

N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

SEPP to support the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header as specified in 3GPP Release 16 TS 29.500 [3]

3GPP TS 29.573 [3], 5.2 (N32) and Annex C.2.2.5

GSMA NG.113 [1], including Detailed Design of hop-by-hop TLS

Reason for test

To verify that i-SEPP can successfully delete N32 connection between i-SEPP and r-SEPP.

To verify that when the request is for tearing down the existing N32-f TLS connection, the "SecNegotiateRspData" IE shall contain "Supported security capability" set to "NONE"

and, subsequently, both SEPP shall terminate the N32-c and N32-f TLS connection.

Initial configuration

i-SEPP is configured with r-SEPP root certificate.

r-SEPP is configured with i-SEPP root certificate.

N32 connection is configured and N32-c and N32 working successfully (test A.2.1 and A.2.2)




Figure 7: Test context – Stop N32 connection

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if the i-SEPP has deleted N32 connection between i-SEPP and r-SEPP.

Test procedure

-	Test procedure	Expected behaviour
1	Stop the remote r-SEPP using i-SEPP configuration	r-SEPP is no more active in i-SEPP i-SEPP is no more active in r-SEPP
2	Try to exchange N32 messages by sending signalling from the 5G SA signalling simulator	Not possible to exchange N32 messages, because the N32 interface is stopped

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE N32-c				
1	-->		POST ../exchange-capability (SecNegotiateReqData) path: /n32c-handshake/v1/exchange-capability/ authority: r-SEPP plmnIdList : i-PLMNid sender: i-SEPP supportedSecCapability: NONE 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	To tear down the N32-f TLS connection, this IE shall set SecurityCapability as "NONE".
2	<--		200 OK (SecNegotiateRspData) plmnIdList: r-PLMNid sender: r-SEPP selectedSecCapability: NONE 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	Check that N32 connection is closed on r-SEPP and i-SEPP

A.2a Basic N32 connection (for PRINS)

A.2a.1 Create N32 connection between PMN SEPPs

Description

The initiating SEPP shall initiate a Security Capability Negotiation procedure towards the receiving SEPP. For this purpose, an N32-c end-to-end TLS connection shall be setup between the PMN SEPPs.

Applicability

3GPP Release 16 or later

N32 (PRINS)

Related core specifications

SEPP to support the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header as specified in 3GPP Release 16 TS 29.500

3GPP TS 29.573 [3], 5.2 (N32) and Annex C.2.2.5

GSMA NG.113 [1], including Detailed Design of PRINS

Reason for test

To verify that i-SEPP can successfully establish N32-c with r-SEPP and negotiate PRINS.

Initial configuration

i-SEPP is configured with r-SEPP root certificate.

r-SEPP is configured with i-SEPP root certificate.

The IP address of the r-SEPP is configured statically or discovered dynamically by DNS as described in SEPP discovery test (See A.1)




Figure 8: Test context – Create N32 connection

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if

- A TLS connection for N32-c has been established
- N32-c between i-SEPP and r-SEPP is established and PRINS is selected for N32-f

Test procedure

-	Test procedure	Expected behaviour
1	Configure the r-SEPP using i-SEPP configuration Configure the i-SEPP using r-SEPP configuration	r-SEPP has a context for i-SEPP i-SEPP has a context for r-SEPP

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE TLS HANDSHAKE (for N32-c)				
1	-->	i-SEPP	Hello	
2	<--	r-SEPP	Hello Certificate (r-SEPP) CertificateRequest ServerKeyExchange r-SEPP_HelloDone	
3	-->	i-SEPP	Certificate (i-SEPP) i-SEPP_KeyExchange CertificateVerify ChangeCipherSpec Finished	
4	<--	r-SEPP	ChangeCipherSpecFinished	
PROCEDURE N32-c HANDSHAKE (HTTP/2 capability exchange)				
1	-->	i-SEPP	POST ../exchange-capability (SecNegotiateReqData) path: /n32c-handshake/v1/exchange-capability/ authority: r-SEPP plmnIdList: i-PLMNid sender: i-SEPP n32HandshakeId supportedSecCapability: TLS or PRINS 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	
2	<--	r-SEPP	200 OK (SecNegotiateRspData) plmnIdList: r-PLMNid sender: r-SEPP selectedSecCapability: PRINS N32HandshakeId 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	

A.2a.2 Parameter Exchange for PRINS

Description

The initiating SEPP shall initiate a Parameter Exchange procedure towards the receiving SEPP if PRINS is selected in the basic N32 connection setup. This includes cipher suite negotiation and optionally the exchange of protection policies or a security profile, used to protect NF service related signalling over N32.

Applicability

3GPP Release 16 or later

N32 (PRINS) (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

3GPP TS 29.573 [3], 5.2 (N32).

GSMA NG.113 [1], including Detailed Design of PRINS

Reason for test

To verify that i-SEPP can successfully negotiate a ciphersuite for using N32 between i-SEPP and r-SEPP and exchange protection policies or a security profile

Initial configuration

See A.2a.1

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if

5. A cipher suite has been selected
6. N32-f context is established
7. Optionally, a protection policy or a security profile is selected

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE N32-c HANDSHAKE (HTTP/2 security parameter exchange)				
1	-->		POST ../exchange-params (SecParamReqData) path: /n32c-handshake/v1/exchange-params/ authority: r-SEPP plmnIdList: i-PLMNid sender: i-SEPP N32-f context identifier 1 Supported cipher suites 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	For Cipher Suite Negotiation
2	<--		200 OK (SecParamRespData) plmnIdList: r-PLMNid sender: r-SEPP N32-f context identifier 2 Selected cipher suites 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	
PROCEDURE N32-c HANDSHAKE (HTTP/2 protection policy exchange) - Optional				
1	-->		POST ../exchange-params (SecParamExchReqData) path: /n32c-handshake/v1/exchange-params/ authority: r-SEPP plmnIdList: i-PLMNid sender: i-SEPP N32-f context identifier 1 Protection policy information or security profiles 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	For protection policy exchange or security policy selection
2	<--		200 OK (SecParamExchRespData) plmnIdList: r-PLMNid sender: r-SEPP Selected protection policy or security profile N32-f context identifier 2 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	

A.3 Multi PLMNid N32 connection

A.3.1 Create N32 connection – multi-PLMNid

Description

Same tests as A.2.1, but the i-PLMN and r-PLMN are composed of several PLMNid.

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 16 or later

N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s (see Figure 1)

Note: N32-f TLS part of the test is not part of the test if not set up immediately or PRINS is negotiated in N32-c. This is because “N32-f TLS” term is used in this test for addressing N32s-f and N32p-f or N32-f in case TLS is negotiated in N32-c.

Related core specifications

See A.2.1

Reason for test

To verify that i-SEPP can successfully establish a N32 between i-SEPP and r-SEPP based on TLS connection with multi-PLMNid

Initial configuration

Reuse of A.2.1

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if the i-SEPP has established

- a N32-c between i-SEPP and r-SEPP and has TLS negotiated for N32-f
- a TLS connection was successfully setup for N32-f

Test procedure

-	Test procedure	Expected behaviour
1	Configure the r-SEPP using i-SEPP configuration	r-SEPP is active in i-SEPP i-SEPP is active in r-SEPP

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE TLS HANSHAKE (for N32-c)				
1	-->	i-SEPP	Hello	
2	<--	r-SEPP	Hello Certificate (r-SEPP) CertificateRequest ServerKeyExchange r-SEPP_HelloDone	Check the SAN of the certificate to verify the PLMN-ID list at r-SEPP is equal to (i-PLMNidList) hosted by the i-SEPP
3	-->	i-SEPP	Certificate (i-SEPP) i-SEPP_KeyExchange CertificateVerify ChangeCipherSpec Finished	Check the SAN of the certificate to verify the PLMN-ID list at r-SEPP is equal to (r-PLMNid) at i-SEPP
4	<--		ChangeCipherSpecFinished	
PROCEDURE N32-c Handshake				
1	-->		POST ../exchange-capability (SecNegotiateReqData) path: /n32c-handshake/v1/exchange-capability/ authority: r-SEPP plmnIdList: i-PLMNidList sender: i-SEPP supportedSecCapability: TLS or PRINS 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	Check PLMN-ID list at r-SEPP matches the i-PLMNidList
2	<--		200 OK (SecNegotiateRspData) plmnIdList: r-PLMNidList sender: r-SEPP selectedSecCapability: TLS or PRINS 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	Check PLMN-ID list at i-SEPP matches the r-PLMNidList
PROCEDURE TLS HANSHAKE (for N32-f) – OPTIONAL (could be setup later)				
1	-->	i-SEPP	Hello	
2	<--	r-SEPP	Hello Certificate (r-SEPP) CertificateRequest ServerKeyExchange r-SEPP_HelloDone	
3	-->	i-SEPP	Certificate (i-SEPP) i-SEPP_KeyExchange CertificateVerify ChangeCipherSpec Finished	
4	<--		ChangeCipherSpecFinished	Check that TLS connection is successful for N32-f

A.3.2 Exchange NF signalling messages via N32-f – multi-PLMNId

Description

Same tests as A.2.2, but the i-PLMN and r-PLMN are composed of several PLMNId.

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 16 or later

N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

Similar to A.2.2

Reason for test

To verify that i-SEPP can successfully forward N32-f messages between i-SEPP and r-SEPP for all PLMNId(s) on i-SEPP and r-SEPP

Initial configuration

Similar to A.2.2




Figure 9: Test context – Exchange N32 messages

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if the i-SEPP has forwarded one N32-f message between i-SEPP and r-SEPP (one per PLMN) and received a message acknowledgement (one per PLMN).

Test procedure

-	Test procedure	Expected behaviour
1	5G SA signalling simulator (sender) will generate a N32 message (example NRF discovery request) to the i-SEPP	i-SEPP will forward the message to r-SEPP r-SEPP will forward the message to 5G SA signalling simulator (recipient)
2	5G SA signalling simulator (recipient) will generate a N32 answer (example NRF discovery response) to the r-SEPP	r-SEPP will forward the message to i-SEPP i-SEPP will forward the message to 5G SA signalling simulator (sender)

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE N32-c				
1	-->		HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Request 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id = i-PLMNid 3gpp-sbi-target-apiroot= r-NRF authority = r-SEPP	1rst PLMNid
2	<--		HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Response status: 200 OK	
3	-->		HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Request 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id = i-PLMNid1 3gpp-sbi-target-apiroot= r-NRF authority = r-SEPP	2nd PLMNid
4	<--		HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Response status: 200 OK	

A.3.3 Stop N32 connection (TLS) - multi-PLMNid

Same tests as A.2.3, but the i-PLMN and r-PLMN are composed of several PLMNid.

Apply on N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s (see Figure 1)

A.4 Certificate error

A.4.1 r-SEPP root certificate error at i-SEPP

Description

This section describes tests containing r-SEPP root certificate errors at the initiating SEPP (See A.2.1).

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 16 or later

N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

See A.2.1

3GPP 33.501 [6]

3GPP 33.517 [12]: clause 4.2.5

Reason for test

To verify that N32-c establishment is rejected by i-SEPP for r-SEPP root certificate error.

Initial configuration

Reuse of A.2.1 and change the pre-configuration

Delete the r-SEPP root certificate on i-SEPP and verify that TLS connection is rejected.

Test procedure

See A.2.1

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if the N32-c establishment is rejected by i-SEPP with the appropriate error cause ("unknow_ca").

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE TLS HANSHAKE (N32-c)				
1	-->	i-SEPP	Hello	
2	<--	r-SEPP	Hello Certificate (r-SEPP) CertificateVerify	WRONG r-SEPP root certificate
3	-->	i-SEPP	Alert message {cause=" unknow_ca"}	Verify the TLS handshake failed with alert message

A.4.2 r-SEPP leaf certificate error at i-SEPP

Description

This section describes tests containing r-SEPP leaf certificate errors at the initiating SEPP (See A.2.1).

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 16 or later

N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

See A.2.1

3GPP 33.501 [6]

Reason for test

To verify that N32-c establishment is rejected by i-SEPP for r-SEPP leaf certificate error.

Initial configuration

Reuse of A.2.1 and change the pre-configuration

Change on r-SEPP the MCC-MNC of CN and SAN of the r-SEPP leaf certificate (with a wrong MCC-MNC – 000-00)

Test procedure

See A.2.1

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if the N32-c establishment is rejected by i-SEPP with the appropriate error cause (“bad_certificate”).

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE TLS HANSHAKE (N32-c)				
1	-->	i-SEPP	Hello	
2	<--	r-SEPP	Hello Certificate (r-SEPP) CertificateVerify	WRONG r-SEPP leaf certificate
3	-->	i-SEPP	Alert message {cause=" bad_certificate"}	Verify the TLS handshake failed with alert message

A.4.3 i-SEPP root certificate error at r-SEPP

Description

This section describes tests containing i-SEPP root certificate errors at the receiving SEPP (See A.2.1).

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 16 or later

N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

See A.2.1

3GPP 33.501 [6]

3GPP 33.517 [12]: clause 4.2.5

Reason for test

To verify that N32-c establishment is rejected by r-SEPP for i-SEPP root certificate error.

Initial configuration

Reuse of A.2.1 and change the pre-configuration

Delete the i-SEPP root certificate on r-SEPP and verify that TLS handshake is rejected.

Test procedure

See A.2.1

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if the N32-c establishment is rejected by i-SEPP with the appropriate error cause ("unknown_ca").

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE TLS HANSHAKE (N32-c)				
1	-->	i-SEPP	Hello	
2	<--	r-SEPP	Hello Certificate (r-SEPP) CertificateRequest ServerKeyExchange r-SEPP_HelloDone	
3	-->	i-SEPP	Certificate (i-SEPP) i-SEPP_KeyExchange CertificateVerify	WRONG i-SEPP root certificate
4	<--		Alert message {cause="unknown_ca"}	Verify the TLS handshake failed with alert message

A.4.4 i-SEPP Leaf certificate error at r-SEPP

Description

This section describes tests containing i-SEPP leaf certificate errors at the receiving SEPP (See A.2.1).

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 16 or later

N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

See A.2.1

3GPP 33.501 [6]

Reason for test

To verify that N32-c establishment is rejected by i-SEPP for r-SEPP leaf certificate error.

Initial configuration

Reuse of A.2.1 and change the pre-configuration

Change on i-SEPP the MCC-MNC of CN and SAN of the i-SEPP leaf certificate (with a wrong MCC-MNC – 000-00).

Test procedure

See A.2.1

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if the N32-c establishment is rejected by r-SEPP with the appropriate error cause ("bad_certificate").

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE TLS HANSHAKE (N32-c)				
1	-->	i-SEPP	Hello	
2	<--	r-SEPP	Hello Certificate (r-SEPP) CertificateRequest ServerKeyExchange r-SEPP_HelloDone	
3	-->	i-SEPP	Certificate (i-SEPP) i-SEPP_KeyExchange CertificateVerify	WRONG i-SEPP leaf certificate
4	<--	r-SEPP	Alert message {cause=" bad_certificate"}	Verify the TLS handshake failed with alert message.

A.5 N32-c error cases

A.5.1 N32-c error with wrong PLMNid

Description

N32-c connection is rejected if PLMNid is not matching the agreed one.

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 16 or later

N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

See A.2.1

3GPP TS 29.573 [3] R17, Section 5.2.2 (Security Capability Negotiation Procedure)

3GPP TS 29.573 [3] R17, Section 6.1.4.2.2 REQUESTED_PURPOSE_NOT_ALLOWED

3GPP TS 29.500 [7] R16, Section 5.2.7 MANDATORY_QUERY_PARAM_INCORRECT

Reason for test

To verify that N32-c establishment is rejected by r-SEPP if PLMNid proposed by i-SEPP is different of PLMNidList configured in the r-SEPP

Initial configuration

Similar to A.2.1

Change the PLMNidList of i-SEPP to a wrong PLMNid (not i-SEPP).

Test procedure

See A.2.1

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if N32-c establishment is rejected by r-SEPP.

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE N32-c				
1	-->		POST ../exchange-capability (SecNegotiateReqData) path: /n32c-handshake/v1/exchange-capability/ authority: r-SEPP plmnIdList: WRONG-PLMNid sender: i-SEPP supportedSecCapability: TLS or PRINS 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	WRONG PLMNid could use MCC=000, MNC=00
2a (If R16)	<--		400 NOK (SecNegotiateRspData) {(MANDATORY_QUERY_PARAM_INCORRECT)}	check that the SecNegociateReqData is rejected
2b (If R17+)	<--		403 NOK (SecNegotiateRspData) {REQUESTED_PURPOSE_NOT_ALLOWED }	check that the SecNegociateReqData is rejected

A.5.2 N32-c error with incompatible supportedSecCapability

Description

N32-c connection is rejected none of the offered supportedSecCapability is matching the agreed one.

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 16 or later

N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

See A.2.1

3GPP TS 29.500 [3] R16, Section 5.2.7 MANDATORY_QUERY_PARAM_INCORRECT

3GPP TS 29.573 [7] R17, Section 5.2.2 (Security Capability Negotiation Procedure)

3GPP TS 29.573 [7] R17, Section 6.1.4.2.2 [REQUESTED_PURPOSE_NOT_ALLOWED]

Reason for test

To verify that N32-c establishment is rejected by r-SEPP if supportedSecCapability proposed by i-SEPP does not include the agreed one.

Initial configuration

See A.2.1

r-SEPP is configured to support only a particular method (TLS or PRINS) for the PLMN IDs of i-SEPP

Change the supportedSecCapability of i-SEPP to not include the selected method above.

Test procedure

See A.2.1

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if negotiation fails

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE N32-c				
1	-->		POST ../exchange-capability (SecNegotiateReqData) path: /n32c-handshake/v1/exchange-capability/ authority: r-SEPP plmnIdList: i-PLMNid sender: i-SEPP supportedSecCapability: wrong value 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	wrong supportedSecCapability value
2a (If R16)	<--		400 NOK (SecNegotiateRspData) ProblemDetail ((MANDATORY_QUERY_PARAM_INCORRECT)	check that the SecNegociateReqData is rejected
2b (If R17+)	<--		403 NOK (SecNegotiateRspData) ProblemDetail (REQUESTED_PURPOSE_NOT_ALLOWED)	check that the SecNegociateReqData is rejected

A.5.3 N32-c error with wrong 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported

Description

N32-c connection is rejected if 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported is not matching the agreed one.

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 16 or later

N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

See A.2.1

3GPP TS 29.500 [3] R16, Section 5.2.7 MANDATORY_QUERY_PARAM_INCORRECT

3GPP TS 29.573 [7] R17, Section 5.2.2 (Security Capability Negotiation Procedure)

3GPP TS 29.573 [7] R17, Section 6.1.4.2.2 [REQUESTED_PURPOSE_NOT_ALLOWED]

Reason for test

To verify that N32-c establishment is rejected by r-SEPP if 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported proposed by i-SEPP is different of True

Initial configuration

Similar to A.2.1 and change the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported [3] = False

Test procedure

See A.2.1

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if negotiation fails.

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE N32-c				
1	-->		POST ../exchange-capability (SecNegotiateReqData) path: /n32c-handshake/v1/exchange-capability/ authority: r-SEPP plmnIdList: i-PLMNid sender: i-SEPP supportedSecCapability: TLS or PRINS 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: False	WRONG 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: False
2a (If R16)	<--		400 NOK (SecNegotiateRspData) ProblemDetail ((MANDATORY_QUERY_PARAM_INCORRECT))	check that the SecNegotiateReqData is rejected
2b (If R17+)	<--		403 NOK (SecNegotiateRspData) ProblemDetail (REQUESTED_PURPOSE_NOT_ALLOWED)	check that the SecNegotiateReqData is rejected

A.5.4 N32-c error with wrong Sender

Description

N32-c connection is rejected if Sender is not matching the agreed one.

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 16 or later

N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

See A.2.1

3GPP TS 29.500 [3] R16, Section 5.2.7 MANDATORY_QUERY_PARAM_INCORRECT

3GPP TS 29.573 [7] R17, Section 5.2.2 (Security Capability Negotiation Procedure)

3GPP TS 29.573 [7] R17, Section 6.1.4.2.2 [REQUESTED_PURPOSE_NOT_ALLOWED]

Reason for test

To verify that N32-c establishment is rejected by r-SEPP if Sender proposed by i-SEPP is different of i-SEPP

Initial configuration

Similar to A.2.1

Change the Sender of i-SEPP to a wrong Sender (not i-Sender).

Test procedure

See A.2.1

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if negotiation fails

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE N32-c				
1	-->		POST ../exchange-capability (SecNegotiateReqData) path: /n32c-handshake/v1/exchange-capability/ authority: r-SEPP plmnIdList: i-PLMNid sender: WRONG-SEPP supportedSecCapability: TLS or PRINS 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot-Supported: True	WRONG PLMNid could use MCC=000, MNC=00
2a (If R16)	<--		400 NOK (SecNegotiateRspData) ProblemDetail (MANDATORY_QUERY_PARAM_INCORRECT)	check that the SecNegotiateReqData
2b (If R17+)	<--		403 NOK (SecNegotiateRspData) ProblemDetail (REQUESTED_PURPOSE_NOT_ALLOWED)	check that the SecNegotiateReqData

A.6 N32-f policing

A.6.1 N32-f policing with wrong 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id (R17)

Description

The SEPP shall implement anti-spoofing mechanisms on 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id. If there is a mismatch, the message is blocked (discarded or rejected).

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 17 or later

N32, N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

See A.2.1

3GPP TS 29.573 [7] R18, section 5.3.3 Table 5.3.3-1

Reason for test

Verify that r-SEPP will discard the receiving N32-f message with wrong 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id (not defined for this N32 connection).

Initial configuration

N32 connection is configured and working successfully (test A.1.1)

Test procedure

See A.2.2

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if r-SEPP discards or rejects the receiving N32-f message.

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE N32-f				
1	-->		HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Request 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id = <u>WRONG</u> -PLMNid 3gpp-sbi-target-apiroot= r-NRF authority = r-SEPP	WRONG PLMNid could use MCC=000, MNC=00
2a	<--		Optional in case of rejection HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Response status: 403 NOK ("CONTEXT_NOT_FOUND")	Verify that N32-f message is rejected at r-SEPP
2b	<--			Verify that N32-f message is discarded (No Nnrf_NF_Discovery response)

A.6.2 N32-f policing with wrong 3GPP-sbi-target-apiroot

Description

The SEPP shall implement anti-spoofing mechanisms on 3gpp-Sbi-target-apiroot. If there is a mismatch, the message is blocked (discarded or rejected).

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 16 or later

N32, N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

See A.2.1

3GPP TS 29.573 [7] R18, section 5.3.3 Table 5.3.3-1

Reason for test

Verify that r-SEPP will discard the receiving N32-f message with wrong 3GPP-sbi-target-apiroot (not defined for this N32 connection).

Initial configuration

N32 connection is configured and working successfully (test A.2.1)

Test procedure

See A.2.2

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if r-SEPP discards or rejects the receiving N32-f message.

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE N32-f				
1	-->		HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Request 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id = r-PLMNid 3gpp-sbi-target-apiroot= <u>WRONG</u> -NRF authority = r-SEPP	WRONG id could use MCC=000, MNC=00
2a	<--		Optional in case of rejection HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Response status: 403 NOK (CONTEXT_NOT_FOUND)	Verify that N32-f message is rejected at r-SEPP
2b	<--			Verify that N32-f message is discarded (No Nnrf_NF_Discovery response)

A.6.3 N32-f policing with wrong authority

Description

The SEPP shall implement anti-spoofing mechanisms on authority. If there is a mismatch, the message is blocked (discarded or rejected).

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 16 or later

N32, N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

See A.2.1

3GPP TS 29.573 [7] R18, section 5.3.3 Table 5.3.3-1

Reason for test

Verify that r-SEPP will discard the receiving N32-f message with wrong authority (not defined for this N32 connection).

Initial configuration

N32 connection is configured and working successfully (test A.2.1)

Test procedure

See A.2.2

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if r-SEPP discards or rejects the receiving N32-f message.

Message flow

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE N32-f				
1	-->		HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Request 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id = r-PLMNid 3gpp-sbi-target-apiroot= r-NRF authority = <u>WRONG</u> -SEPP	WRONG id could use MCC=000, MNC=00
2a	<--		Optional in case of rejection HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Response status: 403 NOK (CONTEXT_NOT_FOUND)	Verify that N32-f message is (rejected at r-SEPP
2b	<--			Verify that N32-f message is discarded (No Nnrf_NF_Discovery response)

A.7 N32-f parameters

A.7.1 N32-f addition of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id

Description

Check that i-SEPP will generate 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id on each N32-f message where 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id is not present.

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 17 or later

N32, N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

3GPP TS 29.500 [3], section 5.2.3.2.1 (R17) [7]

Reason for test

Receive N32-f message without 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id

Check that i-SEPP will generate 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id on each N32-f message where 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id is not present.

Initial configuration

N32 connection is configured and working successfully (test A.2.1)

MNO (i-NRF or i-NF or MNO SEPP) sends N32-f message without 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id

Test procedure

See A.2.2

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if i-SEPP generates 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id on N32-f message where 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id is not present.

Message flow

Step	Direction	MNO SEPP	Message	i-	Comments
PROCEDURE N32-f					
1.a	-->		HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Request 3gpp-sbi-target-apiroot= r-NRF authority = i-SEPP		No presence of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id
2.a	<--		HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Response status: 200 OK		

Step	Direction	i-SEPP r-SEPP	Message	Comments
PROCEDURE N32-f				
1.b	-->		HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Request 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id = i-MCC.i-MNC, srctype = "SEPP", srcfqdn =sepp1.sepp.5gc.i-mnc.i-mcc.3gppnetwork.org 3gpp-sbi-target-apiroot= r-NRF authority = r-SEPP	Verify that 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id is added by i-SEPP
2.b	<--		HTTP/2 Nnrf_NF Discovery Response status: 200 OK	

A.8 SEPP restart

Description

In case of restart with loss of data, the i-SEPP will set-up automatically all connections to the remote peers/partners (r-SEPP) according to the roaming configuration of the i-SEPP.

Applicability

3GPP Rel. 16 or later

N32 (TLS or PRINS), N32s, N32p (see Figure 1)

Related core specifications

See A.2.1

Reason for test

Check that, in case of restart, the i-SEPP will set-up automatically all connections to the remote peers/partners (r-SEPP) according to the roaming configuration of the i-SEPP.

Initial configuration

i-SEPP is configured with r-SEPP root certificate.

r-SEPP is configured with i-SEPP root certificate.




Figure 10: Test context – Create N32 connection

Expected behaviour

Test is successful if the i-SEPP has re-established

a N32-c between i-SEPP and r-SEPP with TLS selected for N32-f

a TLS connection for N32-f

Test procedure

See A.2.1

Annex B Certificate: typical examples

B.1 Root Certificate

Root Certificate (Model 1-PLMN SEPP)

Version: 3 (0x2)

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Issuer:

CN = CA. mnc1.mcc1.3gppnetwork.org, O = PLMNid1, ST = France,

C = FR, [L=Paris/ emailAddress=pki@PLMNid1.com](#)

Validity:

Not Before: Jan 6 07:25:54 2023 GMT+1

Not After : Jan 5 07:25:54 2024 GMT+1

Subject:

CN= CA. mnc1.mcc1.3gppnetwork.org, O = PLMNid1, ST = France, C=FR, L=Paris/emailAddress=pki@PLMNid1.com

Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey

Public-key: (521 bit)

Pub: XX:YY:ZZ:MM:NN:SS:...

X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical

X509v3 Key Usage: critical Key Encipherment, Certificate Sign

CA: TRUE

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

ZZ:XX:YY:LL:MM:PP:...02

Root Certificate (Model 2-Hosted SEPP)

Version: 3 (0x2)

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Issuer:

CN = CA. .<HS-Id>.ipx.network.org, O = .<HS-Id>.carrier, ST = France,

C = FR, [L=Paris/ emailAddress=pki@HS1carrier.com](#)

Validity:

Not Before: Jan 6 07:25:54 2023 GMT+1

Not After : Jan 5 07:25:54 2024 GMT+1

Subject:

CN=CA.<HS-Id>.ipx.network.org, O=.<HS-Id>.carrier, ST=France, C=FR, L=Paris/emailAddress=pki@<HS-Id>carrier.com

Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey

Public-key: (521 bit)

Pub: XX:YY:ZZ:MM:NN:SS:...

X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical

X509v3 Key Usage: critical Key Encipherment, Certificate Sign

CA: TRUE

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

ZZ:XX:YY:LL:MM:PP:...02

Root Certificate (Model 3/4 - Hub SEPP/HTTP Proxy)

Version: 3 (0x2)

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Issuer:

CN = CA. .<Hub-Id>.ipx.network.org, O = .<Hub-Id>.carrier, ST = France,
C = FR, [L=Paris/ emailAddress=pki@<Hub-Id>carrier.com](#)

Validity:

Not Before: Jan 6 07:25:54 2023 GMT+1
Not After : Jan 5 07:25:54 2024 GMT+1

Subject:

CN=CA.<Hub-Id>.ipx.network.org, O=.<Hub-Id>.carrier, ST=France, C=FR, L=Paris/emailAddress=pki@<Hub-Id>carrier.com

Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey

Public-key: (521 bit)

Pub: XX:YY:ZZ:MM:NN:SS:...

X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical

X509v3 Key Usage: critical Key Encipherment, Certificate Sign

CA: TRUE

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

YY: XX:LL:MM:PP:...02

B.2 Leaf Certificate

Leaf certificate (PLMN-SEPP)	Version: 3 (0x2) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 Issuer: CN=CA. mnc1.mcc1.3gppnetwork.org, O=HS1carrier, ST=France, C=FR, <u>L=Paris/emailAddress=pki@PLMNId1.com</u> Validity: Not Before: Feb 6 07:25:54 2023 GMT+1 Not After : Feb 4 07:25:54 2024 GMT+1 Subject: CN=sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.3gppnetwork.org, O=PLMNId1, ST=France, C=FR, <u>L=Paris/emailAddress=pki@PLMNId1.com</u> Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public-key: (521 bit) Pub: XX:YY:ZZ:MM:NN:SS:... X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 Extended key Usage: critical TLS Web Client Authentication, TLS Web Server Authentication X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.3gppnetwork.org, sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1a.mcc1a.3gppnetwork.org, Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 DD:LL/MM:PP:02...
---------------------------------	--

Leaf certificate (Hosted-SEPP)	Version: 3 (0x2) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 Issuer: CN=CA.HS1.ipxnetwork.org, O=HS1carrier, ST=France, C=FR, <u>L=Paris/emailAddress=pki@HS1carrier.com</u> Validity: Not Before: Feb 6 07:25:54 2023 GMT+1 Not After : Feb 4 07:25:54 2024 GMT+1 Subject: CN=sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.HS1.ipxnetwork.org, O=HS1carrier, ST=France, C=FR, L=Paris/emailAddress=pki@HS1carrier.com Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public-key: (521 bit) Pub: XX:YY:ZZ:MM:NN:SS:... X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 Extended key Usage: critical TLS Web Client Authentication, TLS Web Server Authentication X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1.mcc1.HS1.ipxnetwork.org, sepp1.sepp.5gc.mnc1a.mcc1a.HS1.ipxnetwork.org, Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 DD:LL/MM/PP:02...
-----------------------------------	--

Leaf certificate (Hub provider - SEPP)	Version: 3 (0x2) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 Issuer: CN=CA.Hub1.ipxnetwork.org, O=Hub1-provider, ST=France, C=FR, L=Paris/emailAddress=pki@Hub1-provider.com Validity: Not Before: Feb 6 07:25:54 2023 GMT+1 Not After : Feb 4 07:25:54 2024 GMT+1 Subject: CN=sepp1.sepp.5gc.Hub1.ipxnetwork.org, O=SH1carrier, ST=France, C=FR, L=Paris/emailAddress=pki@Hub1-provider.com Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public-key: (521 bit) Pub: XX:YY:ZZ:MM:NN:SS:... X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 Extended key Usage: critical TLS Web Client Authentication, TLS Web Server Authentication X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: sepp1.sepp.5gc.Hub1.ipxnetwork.org, Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 DD:LL/MM:PP:02...
--	--

Annex C Test list

One test list template (excel file) for each interface (N32 (TLS or PRINS) /N32s/N32p) shall be described hereafter:

Test case	i-SEPP	r-SEPP	Test results
A.1.1	PROVIDER1	PROVIDER2	OK/NOK
A.7.1	PROVIDER1	PROVIDER2	

Annex D Parameter definition

D.1 Sbi-Originating-Network-Id

Defined in 29.500 5.2.3.2.15

```
Sbi-Originating-Network-Id-Header = "3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id:" OWS  
3DIGIT "-" 2*3DIGIT [ "-" 11HEXDIGIT ] [ ";" OWS srcinfo ] OWS
```

```
srcinfo = "src" ":" RWS srctype "-" srcfqdn
```

```
srctype = "SCP" / "SEPP"
```

```
srcfqdn = 4*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." )
```

D.2 TLS Alert enum

Defined in RFC 5246 [10] for TLS 1.2 and in RFC 8446 [11] for TLS 1.3

D.2.1 TLS 1.2 Alert enum

```
Alert enum {  
    close_notify(0),  
    unexpected_message(10),  
    bad_record_mac(20),  
    decryption_failed_RESERVED(21),  
    record_overflow(22),  
    decompression_failure(30),  
    handshake_failure(40),  
    no_certificate_RESERVED(41),  
    bad_certificate(42),  
    unsupported_certificate(43),  
    certificate_revoked(44),  
    certificate_expired(45),  
    certificate_unknown(46),  
    illegal_parameter(47),  
    unknown_ca(48),  
    access_denied(49),  
    decode_error(50),  
    decrypt_error(51),  
    export_restriction_RESERVED(60),  
    protocol_version(70),  
    insufficient_security(71),  
    internal_error(80),  
    user_canceled(90),  
    no_renegotiation(100),  
    unsupported_extension(110),  
    (255)  
} AlertDescription;
```

D.2.2 TLS 1.3 Alert enum

```
enum {  
    close_notify(0),  
    unexpected_message(10),  
    bad_record_mac(20),  
    record_overflow(22),  
    handshake_failure(40),  
    bad_certificate(42),  
    unsupported_certificate(43),  
    certificate_revoked(44),  
    certificate_expired(45),  
    certificate_unknown(46),  
    illegal_parameter(47),  
    unknown_ca(48),  
    access_denied(49),  
    decode_error(50),  
    decrypt_error(51),  
    protocol_version(70),  
    insufficient_security(71),  
    internal_error(80),  
    inappropriate_fallback(86),  
    user_canceled(90),  
    missing_extension(109),  
    unsupported_extension(110),  
    unrecognized_name(112),  
    bad_certificate_status_response(113),  
    unknown_psk_identity(115),  
    certificate_required(116),  
    no_application_protocol(120),  
    (255)  
} AlertDescription;
```

Annex E Document Management

E.1 Document History

Version	Date	Brief Description of Change	Editor / Company
1.0	27 Jan 2025	Include comments from Ericsson, Nokia, NTT and BSI	Marc Balon / Tidiane Diallo (Orange)
2.0	April 2026	CR1001 – Missing basic tests on PRINS added	Marc Balon / Tidiane Diallo (Orange) Anja Jerichow, Nokia Andreas Pashalidis, BSI

Other Information

Type	Description
Document Owner	GSMA NG (NRG)
Editor / Company	Marc Balon / Tidiane Diallo (Orange)

Feedback

It is our intention to provide a quality product for your use. If you find any errors or omissions, please contact us with your comments. You may notify us at prd@gsma.com

Your comments or suggestions & questions are always welcome.